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I am far from denying the real force of the arguments in proof of a God… but these do not warm
me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation or make the buds unfold
and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice.
– John Henry Newman
Chapter One: Praelocutio
Introduction
Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov, the protagonist of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and
Punishment, carries out the murder of two individuals—a pawn broker (who is often referred to
in the story as “the old crone”) and the pawn broker’s sister. Throughout the book Raskolnikov’s
motives are not entirely clear. The issue is not simply that Dostoevsky is using his authorial
prerogative to withhold the reasons or motives from us. Raskolnikov is also somewhat doubleminded or at odds with himself such that he acts in conflict with his own desires and ideas at
different points. Before committing the act of murder, he spends months thinking, and the act is a
working out of his theories about morality and ethics, some part of which he has published
previously. Raskolnikov has thought and deliberated, seeking to understand what a man is
capable of, what a man is justified in doing. After this deliberation, he commits the murder
(which becomes murders), and this by the end of part one of a six-part novel. Much of the rest of
the novel recounts Raskolnikov grappling with this act after he has carried it out.
Once the act is committed, Raskolnikov is almost immediately overtaken by a fever and
he continues to distance himself relationally from other people even while circumstances force
him into contact with more and more people. He is by turns extremely generous with those he
encounters and angry at and distant from many of the same individuals. Deep within him there is
conflict; there is turmoil. His soul is divided and at odds. He is plagued by various dreams which
aid in evidencing this. At one point, nearly halfway through the novel he has a dream where he is
back in the room where the murder was committed, Dostoevsky writes:
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The apartment door was standing wide open; he thought a moment and went in.
The entryway was very dark and empty, not a soul, as though everything had been
taken out; quietly, on tiptoe, he moved on into the living room: the whole room
was brightly flooded with moonlight; everything here was as it had been: the
chairs, the mirror, the yellow sofa, the pictures in their frames. A huge, round,
copper-red moon was looking straight in the window. “It’s because of the moon
that it’s so silent,” thought Raskolnikov, “asking some riddle, no doubt.” He stood
and waited, waited a long time, and the more silent the moon was, the harder his
heart pounded—it was even becoming painful. And still the same silence.
Suddenly there came a brief, dry crack like the snapping of a twig; then
everything was still again. An awakened fly suddenly swooped and struck against
the window, buzzing plaintively. At the same moment he made out what seemed
to be a woman’s wrap hanging in the corner between a small cupboard and the
window. “Why is that wrap here?” he thought, “it wasn’t here before…” He
approached quietly and realized that someone seemed to be hiding there behind
the wrap. He cautiously moved the wrap aside with his hand and saw a chair
standing there, and on the chair, in the corner, sat the little old crone, all hunched
up, with her head bent down so that there was no way he could see her face—but
it was she. He stood over her. “Afraid!” he thought, and he quietly freed the axe
from its loop and struck the old woman on the crown of the head, once and then
again. But, strangely, she did not even stir under his blows, as though she were
made of wood. He became frightened, bent closer, and began looking at her, but
she also bent her head still lower. Then he bent down all the way to the floor and
peeked into her face from below, peeked and went dead: the little old crone was
sitting there laughing—simply dissolving in soft, inaudible laughter, trying her
best not to let him hear her. He suddenly fancied that the door to the bedroom had
opened a little, and there also seemed to be laughter and whispering there. Rage
overcame him: he began hitting the old woman on the head with all his strength,
but at every blow of the axe the laughing and whispering from the bedroom grew
stronger and louder, and the little crone heaved all over with laughter. He wanted
to run away, but now the whole entryway is full of people, all the doors to the
stairs are wide open, and on the landings, on the stairway, farther down there are
people, head to head, all looking—but all hushed waiting, silent… His heart
shrank, his feet became rooted and refused to move… He tried to cry out—and
woke up.1
This sequence helps to underline the almost haunting quality the act has had on him. He
is trying to think himself out of the chaos in his soul. He is trying to understand what he is
capable of and whether he can live with the consequences. It is only to Sofya (Sonya)
Semyonovna he is able to pour out his heart and confess, though he stumbles through this

1

Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment (New York: Vintage Classics, 1993), 276-278.
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confession because of his guilt and pride. During this encounter, the conflict in his soul and
Sonya’s awareness of it are evident: “His eyes were burning with a feverish fire. He was almost
beginning to rave; a troubled smile wandered over his lips. A terrible powerlessness showed
through his agitated state of mind. Sonya realized how he was suffering.”2
This thesis deals with themes from epistemology, philosophy of religion, and ethics. It is
about what and how we can know about God. It is about who we are as people and how we live.
Raskolnikov comes face to face with these issues as each of us must. We act and experience
consequences. We cannot run from morality and the outcomes of our choices. Raskolnikov finds
himself plagued by his conscience and also by the personness of Sonya. Slowly he is learning
something about his life, about his actions and choices, about reality. And these answers do not
come at the end of a logical argument but from within his conscience and in the face of a living
person.

Some Preliminary Points
The main premise of this work is that there is knowledge that goes beyond propositional
knowledge (or is deeper than propositional knowledge), and further that this knowledge points
toward something or someone supernatural or transcendent. By propositional knowledge I have
in mind the commonly referenced type of knowledge which focuses on the content and analysis
of propositions, which possess truth values, truth or falsity. For instance, the statement, “I know
that this music (with the referenced music being the sheet music or audio of Chopin’s Sonata 2)
is the Sonata 2 in B-flat Minor, Opus 35 by Frederic Francois Chopin,” which is or is not true
depending on whether or not this actually is the case. This may also be called “knowledge that,”

2

Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 417.
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referencing the way in which it is typically expressed within philosophical writing. Propositional
knowledge provides a significant amount of our knowledge and has the distinct advantage of
being easily analyzable; for instance, if Chopin did not write the music being referenced, then the
proposition is false and does not constitute knowledge.
Propositional knowledge is a vital category of knowledge; much of what it is that we
know can be captured in the form of propositions and the result is something more easily
analyzable and useful for argumentation and development of knowledge. Even within what I am
attempting to point to or emphasize within this work, much will still be able to be captured in
some way by propositional accounts. Therefore, when I mention non-propositional knowledge or
an expansive epistemology, the idea is not to place something in opposition to propositional
knowledge, but to emphasize something that is relevant but perhaps not receiving as much
attention as it deserves.
Eleonore Stump has pointed out that the tendency within some areas of analytic
philosophy3 is to focus on propositional knowledge as the primary form of knowledge. “Knowhow knowledge,” “knowledge by acquaintance,” or some other categorization may sometimes be
referenced or considered, but this is a much less common occurrence.4 Propositional knowledge
is typically expressed in the form “S knows that p,” where “S” represents the knowing subject,
and “p” represents the proposition known by the subject.5

3
Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), ch. 3.
4
Matthias Steup, “Epistemology,” the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/epistemology/, 1, for an example
of this.
5

Ibid.
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Acquaintance knowledge and know-how knowledge are not completely ignored areas of
epistemology but seem not to receive quite as much attention as propositional knowledge. This is
not particularly strange since propositional knowledge clearly has advantages in terms of its
analyzability, and arguably has greater application to many topics within philosophy. However,
my argument will be that there are things like acquaintance knowledge, know-how knowledge,
personal knowledge, and so forth which are evidentially significant for a moral argument for
theism. Moving forward, I will not be using the terms “acquaintance knowledge” or “know-how
knowledge” to refer to what I am pointing to (mostly because my primary epistemological
interlocutors do not use these terms), but it is likely that what is being discussed will overlap
with interpretations of either or both of these (especially acquaintance knowledge).
Eleonore Stump has put forth extensive argumentation for a type of knowledge she
characterizes as “Franciscan knowledge,” and, more specifically, argues for a subspecies of this
knowledge characterized as “knowledge of persons.” This Franciscan knowledge is knowledge
which cannot be expressed in propositional form without remainder. In a similar fashion (though
over a hundred years earlier) John Henry Newman lays out an epistemological system in his
book An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent and differentiates between formal and informal
inference; in his system, informal inference is a process of reasoning that is performed by what
he calls the “Illative” sense, and the results of this process cannot be expressed in purely logical
terms (i.e. in propositional format).
Such a tendency to extend one’s epistemic approach beyond strictly propositional
knowledge is evident throughout the history of the moral argument. Having canvassed a large
swathe of luminaries within the field of moral apologetics, David Baggett and Jerry Walls
describe the approach to knowledge of the various philosophers and thinkers in the following
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way: “Few were narrow logic choppers or abstemious empiricists; they were open to the
deliverances of relations, literature, poetry, emotions, and aesthetics.”6 Reality is not so easily
captured—a moment, a glance, a twitch communicates. A laugh can unsettle or set at ease. A
loved one’s eyes can gleam with disdain or spark with passion. All of the little things between
people, the heights and depths delivered by poetry, literature, and music—these are things that
cannot be fully contained in propositions, at least not without losing some part of what is actually
known in these situations.7

Narratives and Overview of Project
The purpose of this current chapter has been to briefly set the stage for what is to come.
The section just concluded has endeavored to point to the place within the philosophical world at
which discussion is aimed; I have stated that there are important considerations lying beyond
propositional knowledge, and once these have been brought to light we will find additional
resources for the moral argument for theism as we appropriately expand our epistemic strategy.
The first section of this chapter included narrative selections from Crime and Punishment to help
illustrate what is at issue—the intensely personal and experiential questions of how one should
live and how this knowledge may come about. Additionally, I have introduced a storyline—that
of Raskolnikov—to which we shall return in the fifth chapter of this work. As intimated, there
are things Raskolnikov is learning that apply to the subject of this thesis, and we can learn along

6

David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, The Moral Argument: A History (New York: Oxford University Press,
2019), 214.
7
The results are likely to include the propositional, but the experiences generally are not reducible to
propositions; in saying there is more of relevance here, I am in some ways shifting the evaluation from the
conclusions (which may often be in propositional format) to the process of getting there. There is knowledge (maybe
only in the sense of depth if not purely new content) that occurs in the experiences and encounters leading up to the
conclusion itself.
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with him in a way that is not possible in the same way through propositional formats. A fuller,
richer picture of knowledge results, then, from the combination of propositional and experiential
knowledge—or so this thesis will argue.
Martha Nussbaum8 and Eleonore Stump9 have both argued for the utility of literature
within philosophy. Stump emphasizes its importance due to the nature of knowledge of persons.
Though this Franciscan knowledge cannot be propositionally formulated, the form of narrative
provides a means for conveying some part of what would be known in the encounter of persons.
Building from Stump’s work in the following chapters, the use of narratives will aid in the
illustration and clarification of the points regarding knowledge and morality. Hopefully, many of
these points will begin to unfold and become clearer as we continue along in this exploration of
these issues and ideas.
In chapter two we will take a deeper look at John Henry Newman’s and Eleonore
Stump’s epistemological frameworks to illustrate more clearly what the limitations of
propositional knowledge are and what role an appropriately expansive epistemology might play.
Chapter three will consist of an exploration of relevant facets of personalism and development of
personal knowledge. These chapters will prepare us for chapter four in which we will begin
drawing connections to the moral argument for theism. Finally, chapter five will see a return to
Crime and Punishment to further illustrate various points via narrative.

Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
8

9

Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness, chs. 2-4.
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This universal living scene of things is after all as little a logical world as it is a poetical; and, as
it cannot without violence be exalted into poetic perfection, neither can it be attenuated into
logical formulation.
– John Henry Newman
Chapter Two: The Limits of Propositional Knowledge and an Expansive Epistemology
Introduction
The goal with this chapter is to utilize the epistemological considerations of John Henry
Newman and Eleonore Stump in demonstrating the need for an expansive epistemology and
investigating in what ways it can be expressed. It will remain for future chapters to illustrate the
full significance of this toward the philosophy of religion.
It must of course be acknowledged that there will be some difficulties particular to this
enterprise and inherent within its presentation. In thus arguing for non-propositional knowledge
and ways of knowing, it will be impossible to elucidate in exclusively propositional terms that
which is, by definition, not propositional. Especially in describing where these expansive
epistemology concerns occur, much may be analyzed and explained, but conveying, on the other
hand, what is contained or expressed in non-propositional knowledge is not so easily achievable.
Thus, great care will be taken to express or gesture toward things as much as possible. In
addition, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, narrative and literature will be more apt
at expressing what may escape propositional formulation, and thus will be a part of the attempted
elucidation. With such preliminaries concluded we will begin with an examination of John Henry
Newman’s thought as contained within An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.10

10

John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Columbia, SC: Assumption Press, 2013).
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Newman’s Epistemology
Newman’s epistemological system is fairly intricate and yet in places ambiguous.11 We
will begin by investigating his conception of apprehension along with his distinctions between
the real and the notional. Following this we will briefly assess his theory of inference, which will
lead to a discussion of the illative sense.

Apprehension, the Real and the Notional
Apprehension is the intelligent acceptance of an idea.12 This does not require
comprehension; at minimum it is seeing that something is so, having an awareness of something.
Once we have apprehended a proposition,13 we can doubt, infer, or assent. To doubt is to hold
the proposition in suspense, neither inferring nor assenting. To infer is to conclude on the basis
of premises, while to assent is to give absolute acceptance to a proposition without any
conditions. Of these, inference and assent are most important to the present discussion and will
be fleshed out more in what follows.
Apprehension can take place in two different modes: real and notional (and thus an
assent or inference may be one or the other). The category or mode “real” refers to things and its
referents are singular terms and unit; 14 what is real most often comes from experience. The mode

For instance, there is some ambiguity in how he describes “first principles” and the manifestation of the
illative sense; Andrew Meszaros, “Newman and First Principles: The Noetic Dimension of the Illative Sense,” The
Heythrop Journal 59, no. 5 (September 2018): 770-782, 770f.
11

Newman’s explanations of apprehension and the differences between “real” and “notional” are primarily
unpacked within chapters 1-4 of the Grammar of Assent.
12

13
Note here that in Newman’s terminology a proposition is essentially any item or concept which can be
known or apprehended in some sense, and not the more modern and narrow philosophical usage for expressing
“knowledge that.”

By “unit,” Newman means that what is apprehended in real apprehension is unified, or taken as one
thing, in contrast to notional apprehension, which views things more by its parts and separates what is apprehended
into “notions.”
14
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of “notional,” however, does not stand for things, but for notions, and its referents are common;
what is notional comes from abstraction.15 It is important to realize that the descriptors of “real”
and “notional” are not strictly governing the thing apprehended and informing us of the nature of
what is apprehended, but rather is describing in what way the individual has apprehended. That
is, it is individuals who apprehend propositions really or notionally and not the things
apprehended which are either real or notional. This being said, there will be things which may
not admit of real or notional apprehension due to the nature of reality.16
Some examples are in order. Note how a child in school may memorize long passages of
someone like Homer or Shakespeare and have some cursory or limited understanding of the
poetry, but then later in life, after experience has opened his eyes and expanded his horizons, the
poetry unlocks, so to speak, within his mind and settles on him with a depth and wisdom he
could not apprehend before that moment.17 Again, one may consider something like grief. It is
one thing to contemplate the idea, “My loved ones are mortal and will die because all people
die,” and another to learn that your father has cancer, or your sister has been in a car accident. In
both cases, the first apprehension is notional while the second is real.
Certain distinctions can further clarify and distinguish the real and the notional.18 First,
notional apprehension has to do with notions or aspects of things, working with aggregates,

15

Newman, Grammar of Assent, 22.

16

For instance, it seems unlikely that one could have a real apprehension of a logical principle like the law
of non-contradiction, though one may be able to have a real apprehension of some situation in which the law applies.
17

For a similar example of Newman’s own: John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent, 56f.

18
I am indebted to the analyses of both John Crosby and Michael Olson here: John Crosby, The
Personalism of John Henry Newman (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 38ff;
Michael R. Olson, “Real Apprehension in Newman’s An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent,” International
Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2005).
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while real apprehension has to do with concrete unity. Consider our first example of a Homeric
or Shakespearean poem. To apprehend it notionally is to apprehend its parts, to see the literary
style or themes, to comprehend the words, to see the narrative structure. To apprehend it really is
to see it as that poem, as a unit, and whole work, not comparing it to other works. It is singular,
and the apprehension of it is an apprehension of it as whole and sui generis.19
Second, notional apprehension begins and ends with the mind’s own abstract and
constructive reasoning properties, while real apprehension is experiential. Take our Homeric or
Shakespearean example again; in our notional apprehension, we are taking the separate aspects
of the poem, isolating, and comparing them with other elements to comprehend the poem. We
think about a theme of love and consider how other poems have developed the same theme and
so forth. In doing such, we are taking disparate notions, comparing and contrasting, constructing
new understandings and concepts. All of this is internal and within the mind. To apprehend it in
a real way, we must in some way experience it. Perhaps the child of our example read a
Shakespearean sonnet on love for class and found it interesting and insightful. Then, upon falling
in love for the first time, he feels within his soul the Shakespearean lines:
… Love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover to remove.
O no! it is an ever-fixed mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken.20
Now, because of the new experiences regarding love, the child experiences the poem in a
way he had not before and enters into a real apprehension of it.

19
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 182f. In Olson’s technical language: “… It is the unity of actuality, a unity
that comprehends complexity by virtue of hierarchical ordering”; see Olson, “Real Apprehension,” 509.

William Shakespeare, “Sonnet 116: Let me not to the marriage of true minds,”
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45106/sonnet-116-let-me-not-to-the-marriage-of-true-minds, lines 2-6.
20
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Finally, notional apprehension is more capable of achieving clarity while real
apprehension is often affected by a sort of obscurity. This is primarily due to the nature of what
is being apprehended in each case. Notions, abstracted and separated from the experience and
concrete unity, can be expressed in clearer terms, generally; in fact, the formal inferential process
(to be discussed in detail next) generally begins by first stripping down terms to the most
narrowly defined premises possible. The objects of real apprehension, however, must remain
concrete and experiential and often resist clear expression (at least in propositional terms).
Again, propositions (objects/things/notions) to be apprehended can be apprehended really
or notionally. We may then infer or assent.21 It will now be useful to further clarify Newman’s
conception of inference, which can be either formal or informal, as well as the illative sense
which is instrumental in the latter.

Formal and Informal Inference
When Newman uses the term “inference,” he seems to have in mind our normal
reasoning processes such as deductive, inductive, or abductive reasoning. By formal inference
Newman means something very much like deductive logic or deductive reasoning. Newman’s
inferential method consists of establishing propositions, forming a proof, and analyzing it, which
Newman sees as resulting in the Aristotelian syllogism. He does not think the presentation is
required to be this technical, however, to be inferential. “Verbal reasoning, of whatever kind, as
opposed to mental, is what I mean by inference, which differs from logic only inasmuch as logic
is its scientific form.”22

21

Again, we are leaving out doubt as an action here since it is extraneous to our purposes.

22

Newman, Grammar of Assent, 174.
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Formal inference as a process is focused primarily on the relations of propositions to one
another and works most effectively when terms are as simple and narrow in meaning as possible;
the more abstract and notional the terms are, the more suitable the propositions become for the
inferential process.23 Newman describes this transition masterfully:
The concrete matter of propositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic
reasoning, as marring the simplicity and perfection of its process. Words, which
denote things, have innumerable implications; but in inferential exercises it is the
very triumph of that clearness and hardness of head, which is the characteristic
talent for the art, to have stripped them of that depth and breadth of associations,
which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life, to have
starved each term down till it has become the ghost of itself, and everywhere one
and the same ghost, “omnibus umbra locis,” so that it may stand for just one
unreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs, for a relation, a
generalization, or other abstraction, for a notion neatly turned out of the
laboratory of the mind, and sufficiently tame and subdued, because existing only
as a definition.
Thus it is that the logician for his own purposes, and most usefully as far
as those purposes are concerned, turns rivers, full, winding, and beautiful, into
navigable canals.24
And so formal inference is most closely linked to notional apprehension, but this is where
the need for consideration beyond the propositional arises. The world we encounter is a living
world of concrete entities—the world is real, not notional. Formal inference and the notional can
deliver important and useful information, but when what is needed is real and experiential, it
may be that notional apprehension misses something of value.25 In discussing the deliverances of
science, which falls under this heading, Newman says, “Science, working by itself, reaches truth
in the abstract, and probability in the concrete; but what we aim at is truth in the concrete.”26

23

Ibid., 174-175.

24

Ibid., 176.

Remember our second distinction regarding “real” and “notional”: the notional cannot extend beyond
“the mind’s own abstract and constructive reasoning properties.”
25

26

Newman, Grammar of Assent, 183.
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Logic and formal inference can provide ways of bringing facts together and processing them
efficiently, and works well for deliberating and puzzling things out within the mind.27
Consequently, formal inference is not lacking utility. Beyond this, it is natural and good as a way
we process information and move forward in the world. But there are limitations—formal
inference cannot well deliver apprehension of the real, which is individual, concrete, and
experiential.28
Newman’s theory of how we come to apprehend in a real way involves the use of the
illative sense and the process of informal inference. For Newman the illative sense is the innate
faculty that carries out informal inferences and allows one to reason in concrete matters of fact;
formal inference is not suited for the task because concrete reality has innumerable aspects that
cannot be propositionally (in the narrow sense) analyzed the way notions can. John Crosby says
that informal inference “works not only with our experience as formulated in propositions, but
also with that ‘excess’ of experience that cannot be propositionally formulated.”29
By informal inference, Newman seems to have in mind something similar to inductive or
abductive reasoning. The illative sense is a faculty like that of Aristotle’s phronesis, which “is
the directing, controlling, and determining principle in such matters [conduct], personal and
social.”30 As an example, Newman believes formal inference may be able to lead to laws, rules,
principles, examples, and so forth in something like ethical systems, but these must be applied to
concrete, particular cases. When the concrete and particular is faced, an individual reasons

27

Ibid., 188.

28
This does not mean nothing of our experience can be captured in notional form, but only that the two
(experience and the “notional”) are not perfectly well-suited to each other.
29

Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, 120.

30

Newman, Grammar of Assent, 231.
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himself, personally, from the totality of his knowledge and experience. He uses his judgment and
makes deliverances, heart and mind, about that which has not been proved except possibly in the
abstract.31
Crosby relates formal and informal inference to computer processing; a formal inference
can be processed surely and efficiently by a computer, but an informal inference cannot just
because the relevant data could never be sufficiently entered into the computer.32 As should be
clear, this follows from our understanding of real apprehension. For one to apprehend really, one
must apprehend the proposition as a concrete unit; it is indivisible and experiential.33 Because the
concrete is beyond what can be fully analyzed and formally inferred, informal inference is
personal, and we take responsibility for the conclusions at which we arrive.34 For these reasons
Crosby suggests two primary distinctions of informal inference as active and personal.35 Formal
inference can be passive and anonymous in the sense that one can follow the reasoning to its
conclusions without involving anything unique to himself. Everything is notional, abstract, and
could be accomplished by anyone the same way with the same data. Informal inference moves
beyond these. In the end, we need propositional accounts of knowledge; these considerations

31
It is not clear that an epistemic “faculty” (i.e. an illative sense) is necessary or useful for capturing these
ideas, but as this is how Newman has presented his epistemology, I will retain the use of “illative sense.” At the
least, hopefully the comments regarding the illative sense will make clear what processes are at issue.
32

Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, 120.

I would like to clarify once again Newman’s usage of “proposition” in a broader sense; this particular
point regarding apprehending the proposition as a concrete unit is an example of what I am arguing cannot be fully
reduced to propositional knowledge, though some propositions can be stated. For example, “I know Mary”; I can
utter this proposition and extend various premises in propositional format, but if I apprehend Mary in a real way, as
a concrete unit, there is more that is known, or at least something deeper that is known than what I am expressing in
however many propositions regarding the conclusion “I know Mary.” Hopefully, as we continue this will become
clearer and its significance will become more apparent.
33

34

Ibid., 123.

35

Ibid., 125.
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should serve to remind us that there may be relevant items aside from the propositional account
which are evidentially significant.
The illative sense may be more or less evident in various cases. My illative sense may be
less evident today on a conclusion relating to science such as that the earth revolves around the
sun; on the other hand, in many moral and religious situations it may be far more apparent as in
forming a decision on utilitarianism versus consequentialism or deliberating on a difficult moral
dilemma. In these decisions I must move beyond formal inference to make a conclusion that is to
some extent personal.
We will further narrow in on the importance of these things for our assessment of
propositional knowledge and an expansive epistemology below, but this should serve to provide
an understanding of Newman’s epistemological framework. We shall now turn to the work of
Eleonore Stump regarding what she calls Franciscan knowledge, as detailed within her
magnificent work Wandering in Darkness.
Stump’s Epistemology
Eleonore Stump begins her epic work with a detailed explanation of her project. Her
overall purpose has to do with utilizing narratives in a defense against the problem of suffering;
she believes narratives are useful because of her theory of Franciscan knowledge. In a
typological sense one can think of the analytical tradition and propositional accounts of
knowledge as Dominican, and knowledge and methods that are not these, as Franciscan,
referencing the medieval monks Dominic and Francis. By utilizing these types she is seeking to
broadly outline two different methodologies, but not to pit them against each other. The goal is
that both Dominican and Franciscan methods might be used to reach a fuller, more robust
account of reality.
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In detailing her view of this Franciscan knowledge Stump begins by describing many of
the current theories of knowledge. She suggests these theories all characterize knowledge as a
“matter of having an attitude toward a proposition, of knowing that.”36 There are examples of
knowledge, however, which do not seem to be reducible to propositional knowledge, such as
sensory knowledge. While propositional accounts can convey something about the color red, a
propositional account cannot adequately provide answers to questions like “what is redness?” or
“what is it like to see red?”37 Along with sensory knowledge, Stump suggests that there is a
knowledge of persons that, similarly, cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge; both
sensory knowledge and the knowledge of persons can be seen as subsets of Franciscan
knowledge.
Consider a situation in which there is a woman Mary who has been locked away from
human contact since birth and, though she has access to any and all information regarding the
world and science, has only ever had third-person experiences or received third-person accounts.
She knows everything that can be propositionally known of persons but has never had any sort of
interaction with another person which could constitute a second-person experience (which
includes narrative and story). After some time Mary is rescued from this imprisonment and
reunited with her mother. “When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that
Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother

36

Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 49.

Even in cases in which a proposition can result, such as “that appears red-ly to me,” or “that seems to be
a red house,” etc., the point is that this does not exhaust what is actually known; red is not reducible to these
propositions. Though this distinction may not be novel and may seem trivial, I do not to believe this to be the case,
as I hope to display as we move forward. In some part this is because, as I stated earlier, I am trying to shift focus
from the propositional conclusion (such as “that seems to be a red house,”) to the process/experience in which we
receive the knowledge; it is in the actual experience and the things involved in the experience that we find the
evidentially significant material.
37

18
that could be made available to her in non-narrative propositional form, including her mother’s
psychological states… what will come as the major revelation to Mary is her mother.”38
A brief look at the nature of autism can help display this knowledge of persons and what
its absence looks like. “Whatever ties together the different clinical signs of all the degrees of
autism spectrum disorder, the most salient feature of the disorder is its ‘eerie imperviousness,’ its
absence of acting in concert.”39 Stump’s assertion is that what is lacking in such individuals is a
knowledge of persons and their mental states.
The current research on mirror neurons seems to suggest that the mirror neuron system is
“the foundation for the capacity of all fully functional human beings at any age to know the mind
of another person.”40 There is considerable research indicating that some of the knowledge
gained in the interaction of persons is not only the result of a process of reasoning, but is a sort of
experiencing in the mind of the actions or intentions of the other person as the other is
experienced. “John knows that Mary is going to give him a flower because he first knows Mary,
her action, her emotion, and her intention—but these are things which he knows by, as it were,
seeing them, and not by cognizing them in the knowledge-that way.”41
In interactions between persons there is more occurring than what can be propositionally
captured. Each individual as experienced (i.e. Mary’s mom, from the above example) is more
than the sum of the propositional knowledge about them (i.e. all of the information Mary had
about her mom prior to meeting her mom). Stump does, as mentioned above, extend this beyond
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persons, but it is with knowledge of persons that she is primarily concerned. As has been
referenced, though not spelled out, an interaction which yields this Franciscan knowledge will
typically be of a second-personal nature. An individual has an experience with another
individual. When a second-person encounter occurs, one is placed in position to gain knowledge
of persons of the sort being indicated in this section.
Though an account of this experience (given its nature) cannot be propositionally
provided, it does not follow that no account is possible. It is also worth noting that a given firstor third-person account would be insufficient to convey the knowledge which is at stake here.
What is needed is a vehicle such as narrative or story. A story or narrative enables the listener or
reader to have a part of what would have been had if this individual had undergone the secondperson experience but without actually being a direct participant in the experience.42
Though Stump’s Franciscan knowledge functions in many ways as a negative thesis (i.e.
Franciscan knowledge is defined as knowledge which is not propositional) it is very natural and
intuitive as is well illustrated through the autism example. Though it may be difficult to spell out
what I know when I know that you are in a bad mood or being sarcastic, we fully understand
what it looks like when someone is not picking up on these things or unable to grasp them.
Stump compares Franciscan knowledge to perception; it is possible to be wrong in what one
sees, as in a mirage or having an injury to the eye. However, we understand that these are
illusions and exceptions and they can be disambiguated from perception when it is functioning
normally.43 And so Stump says, “… Franciscan knowledge could be understood as the veridical
delivery of a cognitive faculty when that cognitive faculty is aimed at veridicality and is
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functioning properly in its typical environment where veridicality is a matter of an epistemic
connection to things in the world that is correct and reliable but that is nonetheless not
propositional.”44

Expansive Epistemology Considerations
Regarding our epistemological considerations some important points can now be made.
Two things are needed: to show where there may be limits to propositional knowledge and to
show the utility of an expansive epistemology. It is quite clear that Stump is arguing for an
increased awareness and utility of non-propositional knowledge, or Franciscan knowledge. She
emphasizes at many points that this is not to decry or subtract from propositional knowledge;
propositional knowledge has much to contribute to philosophy and epistemology. However, for
some enterprises within philosophy, such as Stump’s work on the problem of suffering, this nonpropositional knowledge has something important to offer. As I have suggested above, when
working with philosophy of religion and ethics (at minimum), personal and experiential angles
on knowledge are important and useful. Stump’s categories and negative thesis provide tools for
trying to identify problem areas, especially when it comes to apprehending knowledge of
persons.
Both authors clearly place a heavy emphasis on the role of experience and interpersonal
relationships in knowledge. Newman has similar things in mind in relation to the limits of
propositional knowledge, which is most evident in his clarification of formal inference.
Interestingly, the categories of “notional” and “real” do not strictly line up with Dominican and
Franciscan knowledge as may seem to be the case initially. This is because the categories of
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notional and real primarily have to do with the individual’s apprehension of a given object or
proposition, etc. and is not something inherent within the proposition, whereas Dominican
knowledge is defined as propositional and Franciscan knowledge is not propositional. However,
there are resonances and at least some important overlaps; we are more likely in Dominican
methods to apprehend notionally and in Franciscan methods to apprehend really. At least, such
seems to be the case on my understanding of these two authors. In a very rough comparison,
formal inference is a process which leads to Dominican knowledge and informal inference may
lead to Franciscan knowledge; at the same time, often the conclusions of either process can be
stated propositionally (in the case of Franciscan knowledge, it is just that the proposition does
not contain all of the relevant information—there is more known, or what is known is more
deeply known, than what the proposition conveys).45
And so, both Stump and Newman have delineated places in which propositional
knowledge or formal inference ends, and both have linked this to religious issues; for Stump the
answer to the problem of suffering is not merely propositional but involves, to some extent, a
knowledge of persons. For Newman, matters of belief and even apprehending who God is come
about largely through informal inference, and so regarding religious belief he says, “Persons
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influence us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no
man will be a martyr for a conclusion.”46
To our second aspect of where the expansive epistemology functions or is useful, the
most direct answer is in personal knowledge. This is, however, not just the knowledge of persons
which Stump argues for, but also a certain knowing as persons, both of which will be fleshed out
further in the following chapter. Non-propositional knowledge is clearly more than just
knowledge of persons, but it is certainly not less. As the moral argument for God’s existence is a
field in which inter-personal relationships are critical, so far shall personal knowledge be of
relevance as evidence in need of explanation.
By expansive epistemology, then, is meant an epistemological system which considers
non-propositional evidence no less than propositional. When one approaches an issue with an
expansive enough epistemology, one is beginning open to the deliverances of a wider range of
input. This does not negate the requirement of truth inherent within any proper conception of
knowledge but acknowledges the fullness of reality. When one thinks about the existence of
God, one is interested in truth in the concrete, not just in the abstract.

Conclusion
This chapter has laid out the relevant epistemological details of Newman’s Grammar of
Assent and Stump’s Wandering in Darkness with special attention to highlighting the limits of
propositional knowledge and at least gesturing toward the nature of non-propositional
knowledge. The following chapter will consist of an attempt to narrow in on some important
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considerations regarding persons and personal knowledge to prepare us for approaching moral
arguments for theism.
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“No one, no one in the whole world, is unhappier than you are right now!” [Sonya] exclaimed,
as if in a frenzy, not hearing [Raskolnikov’s] remark, and suddenly burst into sobs, as if in
hysterics.
A feeling long unfamiliar to him flooded his soul and softened it all at once. He did not
resist: two tears rolled from his eyes.…”47
Chapter Three: Personalism and Personal Knowledge
Personalism as a Philosophical Perspective and the Dignity of Persons
Personalism
Issues of religious belief, morality, and ethics are issues of persons and between persons.
It is not my wife or father or best friend who must decide whether I will profess belief in God or
whether I should steal or lie. In doing these things, I am also dealing with persons and as a
person. At least within Christian religious tradition, God is seen as personal though not
necessarily a person (at least in our normal understanding of the term), and so my decision to
believe in God would include some element of expecting or engaging in personal interaction
with God. If I lie or steal, there is someone48 to whom my actions are directed. And so personal
encounters are of paramount importance for this project and require some additional
development.
This will not be all, however; it is also important to consider what it means that we, as
persons, encounter the world. What I mean is that each of us in virtue of being a person
experiences the world in particular and individual ways; there are things about us and our
backgrounds that affect our perspectives. There is also something to the reality that I learn things
in virtue of being a person and not an animal, robot, lampshade, for example. I, as a person, am
somehow active in the world in a way that non-persons are not. Therefore, vital to the issues of
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religious belief, morality, and ethics is knowledge of persons as well as knowing as persons. This
chapter aims to develop each of these ideas, beginning with a discussion of the nature of
personhood and ending with a narrative example in which I seek to display these ideas.
Personalism has been a response in some ways similar to what I am seeking to display
with epistemology. Crosby describes the rise of personalism as a reaction to some extent to “a
reductionistic, naturalistic image of man.”49 Personalists in response seek to assert the value and
dignity of persons—that there is something more to a person than propositional accounts. A
person is neither exhaustively contained in scientistic, reductionist accounts nor subsumed within
a pantheistic Hegelian system. I am not just a part or moment—I am something distinct, unique,
and incommunicable.50
While discussing his personalist work, Karol Wojtyla says: “The evil of our times
consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed a pulverization, of the fundamental
uniqueness of each human person…. To this … we must propose, rather than sterile polemics, a
kind of ‘recapitulation’ of the inviolable mystery of the person.”51 Here in Crosby’s explanations
of personalism we see a similar awareness of the space in which an expansive epistemology is
needed and useful. It is the awareness of something that will not be contained by our attempts to
narrowly define and explain.
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Another important personalist principle is the subjectivity of persons, which has been
developed and influenced by Max Scheler, Karol Wojtyla, and John Crosby, among others. A
person lives, acts, and experiences the world “from within,” in a first-person perspective, as it
were. To understand persons then requires something more than viewing them “from without.”52
As an extension of this point, a person cannot be narrowed down to simply another instantiation
of a human being; rather, as a subjective being, “a creature of interiority,” a person “exists as this
unrepeatable person and so stands in a sense above the human kind, being always more than an
instance of it.”53

The Dignity of Persons
A chapter in John Crosby’s Personalist Papers develops an understanding of the sources
for the dignity of persons.54 By “dignity” he means something different from the rights of a
person. Personal dignity is not concerned with a social dimension the way rights are. I cannot
violate my own rights, though others can; personal dignity, however, can be violated by myself
and others. Personal dignity is also inalienable in a way rights are not. “… I can suspend or block
my rights as a morally relevant factor in a given situation. But I cannot remove my dignity from
a moral situation in this way.”55
Crosby sees the sources for the dignity of persons as twofold. The first is rationality. A
significant part of the philosophical tradition of the West lends support to the idea of the dignity
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of the rational characteristics of human beings beyond that of all other creatures. Mankind “is not
just governed by reason but governs himself with his own reason.”56 This is a fairly
uncontroversial point and is of great value for our understanding of persons. As Crosby
continues to point out, however, if this is our only source for the dignity of persons, this suggests
that one may be able to argue (in contrast to the personalist themes noted above) that in sharing
in the common source of dignity that is rationality, each person is just one additional instance of
a rational human being.
If my dignity rests in the idea that I am rational just as are all other instances of human
beings, then I could be replaced by another human being sharing in that same rationality without
anything of significance being lost. Indeed, to some extent, this is exactly what Peter Singer
suggests in his work Practical Ethics. Since Singer is utilitarian in his ethical views, if a
hemophiliac infant interferes with the potential for its parents to have a subsequent healthy
infant, it would be morally justifiable to kill the hemophiliac infant.57 As Crosby emphasizes,
without another source of dignity than rationality, it is not clear how one could adequately or
decisively respond to this view.58
It is worth pausing at this point to reflect on why we might find ourselves desiring to
disagree with Singer’s conclusion to begin with. Is it self-evident that we should not kill infants?
Singer himself points out that the current attitude toward infanticide is based on Christian
principles and influence “rather than a universal ethical value,”59 and that many varied societies
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in the past (Australian aborigines, ancient Greeks, and mandarin Chinese, for example) have seen
infanticide as permitted or even obligatory.60 Singer is not trying to say infants can or should be
killed for any reason or even to equate abortion and infanticide (the context of the infanticide
issue is a discussion of abortion). Rather, he is suggesting that there is no intrinsic difference
between the ethical situations of the two scenarios (neither the unborn child nor the infant is
developed enough to have desires) and that in both cases it is permissible to kill the child
provided “those closest to the child do not want it to live”61 (presumably for utilitarian reasons).
So what is the impulse to disagree with this that many have? Is it only because we have received
a Christian heritage and thus have been conditioned into moral outrage?
Crosby would say no to this—there is a second source of dignity. “Each human being,
besides sharing in this common nature [rationality], also has something of his own—something
his own and not another’s—incommunicably his own.”62 There is something unique and
unrepeatable about each person. Here we see another relation to the expansive epistemological
concerns—as with our understanding of knowledge, there is something about persons that cannot
be fully expressed, confined, or cornered.
Crosby uses the example of Socrates to demonstrate this point. As far as qualities are
concerned, there are of course commonalities of Socrates with others. Other persons have been
human beings, Greeks, philosophers, and even ironic in a “Socratic” way. “But those who knew
and loved Socrates will not grant that everything that they knew and loved in him can be
repeated in others; they will insist that there was in Socrates something absolutely unrepeatable,
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they will say that there was a mystery of the man and that Socrates was not a mere instance or
specimen of this mystery but that he was this mystery, so that another Socrates is strictly,
absolutely impossible…. The incommunicable Socrates was something ineffable, something too
concrete for the general concepts of human language; something knowable through love but not
utterable in concepts.”63 On Crosby’s conception of things, then, the dignity of persons resides
both in their common rationality and their individual incommunicability.

Knowledge of Persons
Having set a foundation regarding the nature of persons (albeit briefly), we will now turn
to the nature of knowledge of persons. Eleonore Stump has helpfully broken down the types of
encounters in which she believes knowledge of persons to result: second-person experiences.
Crosby has also explored some relevant themes, again within his Personalist Papers, where he is
concerned with examining the nature of empathy and its role in interpersonal communication.
In the previous chapter we looked at Eleonore Stump’s account of Franciscan knowledge
and personal knowledge, which is a subset of it. Much of the intention then was to point toward
this non-propositional knowledge, for instance the kind of knowledge of another person that is
often lacking in the encounters of autistic individuals with others. On Stump’s view, this type of
knowledge of persons happens primarily or at least most obviously in the context of a secondperson experience.64 For instance, in our example using Mary and her mother from the previous
chapter, what was needed for Mary to allow her the opportunity for the knowledge of persons
that she could not get propositionally was that she encounter or experience her mother.

63

Crosby, Personalist Papers, 11-12.

64

Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 75ff.

30
In order to further clarify what a second-person experience is and how it differs from a
first or third-person experience, Stump describes things in the following way: “One person Paula
has a second-person experience of another person Jerome only if (1) Paula is aware of Jerome as
a person (call the relation Paul has to Jerome in this condition ‘personal interaction’), (2) Paula’s
personal interaction with Jerome is of a direct and immediate sort, and (3) Jerome is
conscious.”65 Second-person experiences require, as one would expect, at least two individuals
and the one having the experience must have personal interaction with that other, to see them “as
a person.” Jerome has to be conscious, but not necessarily conscious of Paula. For Stump, this is
the bare minimum for a second-person experience, and she finds that this definition of a secondperson account is a more accurate conception than that of first and third-person attempts to
describe the same phenomenon.66 When I say, then, that when Paula and Jerome interact and
Paula learns something about Jerome that is not propositional, I am trying to convey something
like the idea that she has had a second-person experience of Jerome.
Crosby, in his second chapter of Personalist Papers, entitled “The Empathetic
Understanding of Other Persons,” also provides some helpful thoughts related to the knowledge
of persons. Building upon the foundation of the incommunicability of other persons and their
subjectivity, he draws attention to the hiddenness between persons that occurs as a result. This
hiddenness of subjectivity provides an obstacle for knowing a person as a person; however,
Crosby does not believe that it prevents the ability to encounter other persons.67 He writes, “It
would seem that, though we can never experience them exactly as they experience themselves,
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we can nevertheless understand what it is like for them to experience what they experience and
in this way we can achieve a certain solidarity with them. I refer to the act of empathetically
understanding others.”68
This seems to overlap well with Stump’s understanding of mirror neurons and autism
discussed previously: there are things we know about the other person because we are
experiencing it from within ourselves in a way, and this provides a foundation of understanding.
As she points out, the research is suggesting and indicating that this “experiencing of the other
from within” is not the result of cognitive processes, of a chain of reasoning. Through empathy, a
sort of “entering into a person subjectively,” our knowledge of the other person is enlarged—we
have a path through the subjective hiddenness that is characteristic of each individual being an
incommunicable person.69
A second-person experience, then, and especially an empathetic understanding, can
provide the framework in which knowledge of persons can occur. At most, this only provides us
with a way of characterizing the situation in which the knowledge might occur, but it so far does
not provide us with any indication of its content. It should be obvious that some of this content
will be propositional, but my argument is that at least some of it is not. What is propositional can
be easily analyzed and the content expressed and so that will not be of direct relevance here, but
what shall we do with the things which are not propositional? How shall we give an account of
them?
This is where Stump’s concept of second-person accounts comes into the picture. Since
second-person experiences differ from first- and third-person experiences (which might be more
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easily conveyed in propositional format), first- and third-person accounts are also not sufficient.
Stump asserts that what allows us to overcome the difficulties of expressing the second-person
account are stories or narratives. “The re-presenting of a second-person experience in a story
thus constitutes a second-person account. It is a report of a set of second-person experiences that
does not lose (at least does not lose entirely) the distinctively second-person character of the
experience.”70 For this reason, we will return at the end of this chapter to a narrative to attempt a
better illustration of a second-person experience and gesture at the knowledge of persons being
conveyed.

Knowing as Persons
Not only is there knowledge of persons, but there is also a way of knowing as persons.
For this we can think back to Newman’s illative sense as well as focus on the idea of experience.
It is not necessary to pull in all of Newman’s characterization of the illative sense, but it at least
provides an instructional way of thinking about how we approach the world. Every person is
unique in his personality, in his psychological makeup, in his past experiences, in his particular
giftings and skills. The combination of these characteristics reveals a unique, incommunicable
person who interacts with the world as himself and no other. In his sermon “Implicit and Explicit
Reason,” Newman writes:
The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a
quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle
investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication;
another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back
on some received law; next seeing on testimony; then committing itself to some
popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it
makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt
hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself; by personal endowments
and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to
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teach another. It is not too much to say that the stepping by which great geniuses
scale the mountains of truth is as unsafe and precious to men in general, as the
ascent of a skillful mountaineer up a literal crag. It is a way which they alone can
take; and its justification lies in their success. And such mainly is the way in
which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule, but by an
inward faculty.
Reasoning, then, or the exercise of Reason, is a living spontaneous energy
within us, not an art.71
The point that I would like to make here is not concerning a new form of knowledge that
is only obtained as persons, but rather that there is something distinctive and important about
being persons which affects our knowing things. As Newman has expressed, there is something
obscure and difficult to trace in the way the mind moves through premises and conclusions—this
is, at least in part, a consequence of the incommunicability and uniqueness of persons. This
becomes especially evident when the things we are discussing are real, rather than notional—
experiential rather than abstract. When the thing one is trying to know is objective, is abstract
and notional, anyone can follow the premises and find the conclusion. But when one is trying to
conclude on something real, something from experience, it is far more difficult for someone else
to climb that mountain the same way.
Experience is the most important aspect of this. We experience the world. We experience
people and values. We gain knowledge from this. This is not to say that one cannot state
propositionally what it is that she has learned, but stating propositionally what she has learned is
not the same thing as what she learned. If she goes out into the world and learns about morality
and about suffering, she may be able to sit down and write out a propositional account of the
lessons she learned—“I know that taking care of my family is a good thing”; “I know that
actions have consequences”; or so forth. Knowledge of persons and knowing as persons is
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emphasizing something different, though. These propositions are not the things that change us,
that bring us to realizations, that result in a real apprehension and assent to truths. One can state
a thing propositionally all day long, for years and years, but until she knows it as a person (which
often occurs in second-person experiences), she does not know it in the same way. Let us see if a
story can more clearly convey this.

Marmeladov and Sonya
As indicated above, it is very important to remember that not everything occurring within
a second-person experience or within our experience of the world as persons is nonpropositional. There will be aspects of things that can be conveyed propositionally and are
useful. When Jerome smiles and Paula notices the smile, sees his eyes and the contours of his
face, and concludes that Jerome is happy, she can say something like “I know that Jerome is
happy.” There is always more nuance to this, of course, since to some extent, emotions are not
always so neat and clear, but the idea remains. We can often propositionally convey parts of the
second-person experience. When I learn the value and utility of perseverance from overcoming
various challenges and seeing the fruit of that, I can state, “I know that perseverance is an
important value.” However, we cannot convey everything, and it may just be that those things
that we cannot convey propositionally are nonetheless true—and still things we know—and that
they are valuable for understanding ourselves and the world.
In Crime and Punishment, we read of Semyon Marmeladov, a drunkard who has
squandered all of his money and led his family into impoverishment; these actions caused his
daughter Sonya (the same Sonya mentioned above as the eventual confidant to Raskolnikov) to
have to go into prostitution in order to provide money for their family to live. As Marmeladov is
dying the following scene occurs: “But with an unnatural effort he managed to prop himself on
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one arm. He gazed wildly and fixedly at his daughter for some time, as though he did not
recognize her. And indeed he had never seen her in such attire. All at once he recognized her—
humiliated, crushed, bedizened, and ashamed, humbly waiting her turn to take leave of her dying
father. Infinite suffering showed in his face… “Sonya! Daughter! Forgive me!” he cried.”72
What is it that is happening in this scene? By Stump’s and Newman’s lights Marmeladov
has a second-person experience of Sonya, and there is a sort of real apprehension occurring. He
is seeing her garbed as a prostitute. There is of course grief and suffering, but what is it that he
knows? He knows something deep and disturbing within him which forces him to cry out for
forgiveness. Does he just know the propositions “It is wrong to be a drunkard” and “It is wrong
to force my daughter into prostitution due to my drunkenness”? I do not think this narrative
moment can be so encapsulated, and, even if it were, these propositions lose what is valuable in
the knowledge. Indeed, Marmeladov himself is already aware of both propositions before this
scene.
In chapter two of part one of the book, Marmeladov tells Raskolnikov the full story of
how Marmeladov and his family came to be in the situation they are in, including about Sonya.
Marmeladov, in telling this, is fully aware of the wrongness of what he is doing, saying, “I ought
to be crucified, crucified on a cross, and not pitied! But crucify, O judge, crucify, and having
crucified, pity the man!”73 These words are refer to his drunkenness and to what he has caused to
Sonya. So the “infinite suffering” in his face, the cry of forgiveness, the moment captured in the
above scene is not simply the knowledge of the wrongdoing captured in the propositions. It is the
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moment of seeing Sonya, seeing her dressed as a prostitute, perhaps the situation of knowing he
is dying, it is all these things and more, happening as they do at that moment, in that experience
that form the moment and realization Marmeladov has.
Here, Marmeladov has a second-person experience with Sonya; he sees what his actions
have caused, manifested in all their gaudy glory. He is also encountering Sonya as a person; this
is the conclusion of his journey, of his thoughts and actions, of his climbing the mountain. In this
moment of realization, in this encounter, Marmeladov is learning so much more than just
propositions. Now, in this particular case, to say that Marmeladov knows these propositions is to
say something more than what is in the propositions. There is a knowledge of persons, something
irreducible, something deeper in this knowledge, and significantly, it has a profound impact on
Marmeladov as a person.
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“But what I say is this: if one convinces a person logically that he essentially has nothing to cry
about, he’ll stop crying. That’s clear. Or are you convinced that he won’t?”
“Life would be too easy that way,” Raskolnikov replied.74
Chapter Four: Applications of an Expansive Epistemology to the Moral Argument for
God’s Existence
Introduction
In the last three chapters I have attempted to lay out an understanding of an expansive
epistemology and specifically to indicate what this might look like in regards to knowledge of
persons. I should now like to develop these ideas as they relate to the moral argument for theism.
My intention here is to display the ways in which these expansive epistemological concerns can
positively support a moral argument.
Moral arguments for theism have many angles and facets, but are, in general, arguments
seeking to connect some aspect of morality or ethics to the existence of God. One theoretical
form of the moral argument can be expressed in the following form:
1. There are objective moral facts.
2. God provides the best explanation of the existence of objective moral facts.
3. Therefore, (probably) God exists.75
There are, of course, those who do not believe in objective moral facts—perhaps because
there is no personal or impersonal force or mind that can serve as the basis of moral facts.76
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Though this is an important perspective to consider, space does not permit an extensive treatment
in response to those who would deny objectivity to morality. What will be attempted is more in
line with providing support to premise 2 of the argument above. Through discussion of various
moral phenomena, I will seek to illustrate how these phenomena evidentially point to the
existence of God.
There is a helpful clarification from H. P. Owen that may obviate an initial objection
regarding the movement from moral phenomena to the existence of God. In the world, we first
encounter and experience people and their actions, and thus encounter moral claims and values
as things which exist in themselves. Morality and moral facts or any objectivity they possess are
pressed upon us with “their own distinctive meaning and validity.” 77 It is another step to see
behind these things the hand of a Creator, One who is the source of all reality. What this
illustrates is the difference between the “order of knowing” and the “order of being.” For the
theistic philosopher, God is first in the order of being but not in the order of knowing. In our
pursuit of knowledge, we know of and feel the effects of morality before we see from whom they
are derived. In my moving from moral phenomena to the existence of God, I am seeking to
illustrate that “what is first in the order of knowing is second in the order of being.”78
Furthermore, as the abductive language above indicates, it is important to realize that I do
not expect this argument to be deductive or irresistible. Religious belief, by its nature, is a
personal act that each person makes for himself. As discussed previously, each person has his
own history of knowledge and relevant experience which will come with him to the discussion.
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While some theistic arguments, such as the cosmological argument, are more conducive to
logical proof, I do not believe that the moral argument is best construed in this way. To clarify,
this is not to say that logical proofs are not applicable or not useful (indeed we began the chapter
with one), only that they may not be best suited to the task.
We live in a world of experience, of phenomena, and as was discussed in chapter two, it
is real apprehension which is best suited for reaching truth in the concrete. This is especially true
when it comes to matters of goodness and beauty. If I desire truth about such realities, then I
must have some experience of them; I must experience the world as it is and so have real
apprehension of it. While the process may end in a conclusion that can be put in notional terms,
in a proposition (for instance “Therefore, [probably] God exists”), it seems to be the case that
much of the relevant information comes or is deepened as a result of my interaction as person
with the world and/or a personal God. Much in this vein, A. E. Taylor writes, “But the force of
this evidence will naturally be under-estimated by the thoughtless and the self-satisfied; one may
doubt whether it is ever disclosed in its full strength to any man who has never from the bottom
of his heart uttered the cry, ‘God be merciful to me a sinner.’”79

The Moral Argument
Conscience and Obligation
Conscience is, of course, one of the most obvious and historically rich moral phenomena.
John Henry Newman in his An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent spends much of the fifth
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chapter extending an argument from conscience. Conscience has two aspects: “a judgment of the
reason and a magisterial dictate.”80 The judgment of the reason is akin to our sense of right and
wrong while the magisterial dictate functions as a particular voice approving or disapproving of
our actions.
Newman clarifies the nature of conscience: “Thus conscience has both a critical and a
judicial office, and though its promptings in the breasts of the millions of human beings to whom
it is given, are not in all cases correct, that does not necessarily interfere with the force of its
testimony and its sanction to that testimony, conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or
wrong conduct.”81 For Newman, we find in conscience a route to a real apprehension of God.
Clearly Newman does not believe that everyone will interpret the evidence this way, but the
point remains that it is possible. When one lives in the world, as a person, she experiences a
sense known as conscience, which indicates to her what is right and wrong, and produces a
judgment on her actions.
At least one aspect that points in the direction of theism is deliberation about the source
of this phenomenon. Where does the sense of conscience come from? Why do we feel that some
things are right, and some things are wrong? Why do we feel guilty for our actions (especially
the ones that do not directly affect others)? In many cases this feeling of guilt goes beyond what
is imposed on us by others or ourselves but has the character of some outside standard to which
we are being held. Newman wants to suggest that all of these questions and factors points to a
transcendent personal judge—a truth which is confirmed and then extended by special
revelation.
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It is important to note the personal aspect of this. Our phenomenological experience
suggests that feelings of obligation or guilt are always in relation to other persons. A stone does
not hold me obligated to perform actions; I do not feel guilt from the sky.82 And so there seems
to be some phenomenological evidence here supporting a personal transcendent judge.
Though there are various objections to accounts of conscience like the one just given, the
Freudian objection that identifies conscience with the superego is likely the strongest. However,
arguably the two should not be equated, and John Crosby has defended Newman’s conception of
conscience against this objection. Crosby writes, “What Freud calls the superego is a prepersonal and in many cases a depersonalized form of moral life, whereas what Newman calls
conscience is an eminently personal form of moral life; therefore Newman’s conscience falls
outside of the Freudian superego and cannot be reduced to it, or explained in the terms in which
the superego can be explained.”83
Because conscience is internal and experienced separately by each individual there is
room for others to come to different conclusions on the same evidence. It is intriguing, however,
to note how well we understand the phenomenon of conscience. It is for good reason that its
deliverances are taken to be instructive and powerful, and even for many to point to theism by
their personal and poignant nature. In the fifth chapter of this work we will return to Crime and
Punishment to explore this a little further.
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Inextricably tied to conscience is moral law and moral obligation or duty. David and
Marybeth Baggett write, “To have a moral obligation to perform an action is, among other things
to be guilty for failing to perform it, perhaps to deserve censure of some sort for neglecting it.
Binding, authoritative obligations seem to be real phenomena in need of robust explanations.”84
We recognize certain things that exert some sort of claim on us, a sense of duty. I ought
not lie to or abuse my family; I ought to provide for my family, to look out for those in society
around me; I ought to be good or just or loving or kind. Now, of course, this is not to say that
everyone feels these claims or feels them to the same extent; it seems apparent, though, that
obligations or duties of this sort affect many people.
It is not outside the realm of possibility to envision one who does not feel (or assent to)
the claim to love truth or to be good. This in no way invalidates the claim itself. Owen, in his
excellent discussion of this issue writes:
An even stronger proof is afforded by the fact that values exert an obligation.
Their obligatoriness is inexplicable unless they are personal. Platonic Forms
could, perhaps, attract. But how could they impose an obligation? How could we
be indebted to them? Why should the failure to enact them engender guilt? I can
betray a person and I know that I deserve the guilt I feel. But I cannot see how I
could betray values if they are impersonal.
Personal theism gives the only explanation by affirming that value-claims inhere
in the character and will of God. In rejecting them we do not merely reject an
abstract good; we do not merely reject our own ‘good’ (in the sense of our ‘wellbeing’); we reject the love which God is in his tri-une being.85
Much like Newman and the discussion of the internal view of conscience, the idea of
outwardly imposed obligations, especially regarding values such as loving the good and truth,
provides evidence in need of an explanation. Especially regarding the issue of obligations and
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values, Owen believes the argument to be more nearing a logical proof. Our next two moral
phenomena to investigate will not follow this tactic, but will be focusing on much more
phenomenological and personal evidence.

Scripture
While the previous point related to general revelation, this next point moves into special
revelation. General revelation provides an important starting place, especially since we have
established that morality comes first in the order of knowing. Conscience and obligation are
important aspects of this, though not the only direction in which things could be argued from
general revelation. Nonetheless, the world as it exists today contains special revelation. Even if
the deliverances of special revelation could not have been perfectly predicted by reason alone, if
the special revelation is a plausible extension of what is found in general revelation and even
serves as being evidentially significant in its own right, then we do a disservice to the pursuit of
truth in ignoring what is here.
Significant portions of Scripture contain narrative (within the Old Testament: the socalled “historical books,” and in the New Testament: the “Gospels” and “The Acts of the
Apostles”). These narratives consist of some of the most timeless and pervasive stories in all of
western culture. Some of the stories have parallels in other cultures (creation accounts or flood
myths, for example). There is an argument that could be made for the transcendent and
fundamental role these stories play—a function which is so psychologically deep, resting on
foundational archetypes—that it is part of the framework of reality; the idea here is that the
themes or ideas in these stories are not just interesting, but actually reflect something of how
reality is constructed and how we experience it. Something of this sort is currently being argued
and unpacked in clinical psychologist Jordan Peterson’s detailed psychological analysis of
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Genesis, presented in lectures available online.86 On this view of the world, Scripture captures
something accurately about how the world actually is and resonates deeply within us. This would
seem to be apparent historically and is still the case in much of the world today (interestingly, not
just in the West, either).
It will help to remember our earlier discussion of Stump and the knowledge of persons.
This knowledge is most clearly visible in second-person experiences and it is only second-person
accounts which seem to capture this. Narrative or story is the most obvious example of a secondperson account. And so for the portions of Scripture which are narrative, we are presented with
an opportunity for a second-person experience. When one reads Scripture, he has the opportunity
to experience something, possibly to have something of a second-person experience, to see
portrayals of faith or love or evil or grace. It matters, of course, what the quality of the narrative
is, and it also matters how the reader comes to the text. If he does not pay attention or if he
distances himself with an overly critical and abstract mindset, if he pulls things apart,
apprehending only notionally, or if he is too skeptical and doubtful—by all these means he adds
difficulties to his encountering the text and engaging in a second-person experience.
This understanding of the second-person experience through narrative accounts is
significant because this is a way through which so many people have come to religious belief. I
am far from suggesting this as a proof in the traditional sense, but arguably it is evidence worthy
of consideration. If someone has encountered God through Scripture in narrative format it may
well be because something about God—about His personal nature—came through in the text.
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From our journey in unfolding expansive epistemological ideas and the knowledge of persons we
have captured the gist of the framework within which such encounters might occur.
The most evident example of what I am trying to point to is the person of Jesus as
exemplified in the Gospels. In reading the Gospels one comes face-to-face, as it were, with the
person of Jesus. One learns something about who He is, one reads of His love of the sisters Mary
and Martha, and their brother Lazarus; one reads of His compassion for tax collectors, outcasts,
and prostitutes; one reads of His wisdom in teaching to crowds and to disciples; one reads of His
humility and grace in bearing an undeserved cross.
Now it must be clarified that I do not suggest any of this in a vacuum. This argument, as
moral arguments generally are, should be alongside other arguments for God’s existence. Their
cumulative force becomes all the more powerful. An “argument from narrative” need not stand
by itself from an argumentative standpoint. But the point is that, even before knowing it is true—
even in doubting—the reading of the narrative of Scripture can impress upon one that it is true
(of course, one does at least need a premise that Scripture is possibly true, that the issue is one to
be considered). Again, this is not a deductive logical argument. I am not saying if someone
experiences Scripture and takes it to be true, then this automatically guarantees its truth in an
objective sense. I am saying, however, that if one has a second-person experience, say, involving
Jesus of Nazareth, and thereby arrives at knowledge of persons of this Jesus, and finds the
account compelling and assents, she is justified in so doing. This should also be seen as working
in conjunction with the foregoing accounts of conscience and obligation. It is not likely one will
assent to such a belief without realizing the need for it—without being aware, in some sense, of a
transcendent personal judge and the realization that she herself has missed the mark and is
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accountable before this judge. It is often the encounter with the narrative, however, which
provides the content for the belief.
This brings us close to the realm of “reformed epistemology,” especially the likes of
Alvin Plantinga. Trent Dougherty and Christ Tweedt write, “According to Alvin Plantinga, when
religious belief is produced by God in a religious believer in the right kind of way, the result is
faith, which is an immediately justified (even more, a warranted) religious belief.”87 The point is
that religious experience of this sort, specifically narrative, has the potential to bring about and/or
support knowledge of the existence of God. This happens through apprehending something of
who God is (especially his moral qualities, His being the Good), and on the basis of this
knowledge, assenting (that is, professing belief). What happens in these encounters, as expressed
in the previous chapter, though perhaps describable in a proposition (i.e. “I know that God
exists”), is not reducible to that. There is more that occurs in the second-person experience
provided by narrative than what can be propositionally described. Propositions, however, are still
quite useful and serve an important role within religious belief, especially in the formation and
reception of doctrine. Where the experience provides something concrete and real and is the
foundation of most religious belief, the propositions (the notionally represented) provide the
clarification and development of the content of religious belief.

The Effect of Moral Exemplars and Personal Influence
The final moral phenomenon that we will discuss here is that of personal influence. John
Henry Newman was a staunch advocate of the role of personal influence as a means of
communicating moral truth (as well as a stellar example of such a thing in practice). The idea
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here follows from much of our discussion of persons and knowledge of persons. As has been
suggested throughout this work, the second-person experience is the best means of
communicating knowledge of persons, and morality has to do primarily with relations among
persons (including, as shown earlier, obligations or conscience, which can be seen as having
their foundations in their relation to God). Thus, it should not come as a surprise that personal
influence between individuals might be a potential source of communicating these moral truths.
Newman, in his sermon “Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth,” writes
at length about the difficulties involved in truth being communicated and the advantages error
has over it in terms of communicability. Notwithstanding, Newman writes that it is through holy
exemplars, the virtuous, through whom moral truth is most emphatically and forcefully
communicated, and this happens through their personal interactions in the world. Newman
writes, “Men persuade themselves, with little difficulty, to scoff at principles, to ridicule books,
to make sport of the names of good men; but they cannot bear their presence: it is holiness
embodied in personal form which they cannot steadily confront and bear down: so that the silent
conduct of a conscientious man secures for him from beholders a feeling different in kind from
any which is created by the more versatile and garrulous Reason.”88
It is of course no revelation that many are converted to religious belief through personal
influence, and therefore some disambiguation is needed here. (1) Not all those exerting personal
influence have good intentions (i.e. not all are holy, to use religious language). In emphasizing
personal influence as a means of conveying moral truth, we are restricting this to moral
exemplars and thus ruling out charlatans, the charismatic but corrupt, and those who are not
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intentionally deceiving others but still not morally exemplary. The fact that personal influence
can be captivating even when the influence is corrupt or ignorant illustrates the power of
personal influence but does not negate the proper unfolding and living out of one who is a moral
exemplar. And so there is an amount of discretion that must be taken. It is noteworthy that this
discretion often happens naturally in personal relationships. What is primarily in mind with
personal influence is personal one-to-one relationships or relationships within small
communities, and not public speakers on stages. Charisma can overwhelm at a distance and with
measured and honeyed words, but in close relationships such a façade is much more difficult to
maintain.
(2) It is also important to note that the suggestion is not that the experience of personal
influence immediately justifies itself and/or guarantees truth without the involvement of other
premises. We will return to this objection in the following section, but a brief comment here will
hopefully be illustrative. Personal influence is not just an experience—there is content involved:
moral truth delivered in a knowledge-of-persons format. What happens is more along the lines of
learning or understanding moral truths as communicated or embodied by a moral exemplar and
this personal experience being confirmed or supported through one’s own experience or
reflection. Conscience, obligation, narrative, and personal influence will generally all build and
strengthen each other.
(3) We are generally able to discern what is true or not, to some extent, in personal
encounters. In our relationship with another, we discern the rightness of this person’s love and
kindness, the soundness of their wisdom, the wrongness of their manipulation, and so forth. This
does not mean it is always clear or we are always right, but in general we can discern the
difference between a rogue and a holy man. Our conscience speaks, our experience confirms. We
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tend to pick up subtle cues regarding the genuineness of the individual and we also tend to
attempt to verify through our conscience and experience of the world the validity of what the
individual is communicating.
(4) Additionally, there is something especially distinct about the moral exemplar or holy
man, as compared to others or even to “good” men. Newman writes,
The men commonly held in popular estimation are greatest at a distance; they
become small as they are approached; but the attraction, exerted by unconscious
holiness, is of an urgent and irresistible nature; it persuades the weak, the timid,
the wavering, and the inquiring; it draws forth the affection and loyalty of all who
are in a measure likeminded; and over the thoughtless or perverse multitude it
exercises a sovereign compulsory sway, bidding them fear and keep silence, on
the ground of its own right divine to rule them,—its hereditary claim on their
obedience, though they understand not the principles or counsels of that spirit,
which is ‘born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man,
but of God.’89
So much for the nature of personal influence, but how does this relate to Christian
theism? Surely there are examples of moral exemplars who were not theists or Christians, such
as Socrates or Gandhi. This evidences our earlier distinction between the order of knowing and
the order of being. Moral exemplars at least have a real and deep apprehension of morality,
though some of them may not be aware of its source—that is, God. They recognize, they see the
Good, but they do not see its source, they do not realize that “what is first in the order of
knowing is second in the order of being.”
But it is significant that such a thing occurs, that there are individuals who so embody
moral truths that their personal interactions transfix and awe us. It speaks of deep truths to reality
about morality and the nature of things, as well as displays how personal these truths often are.
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There is something different and powerful about a holy man exemplifying good as compared to
our logical, abstract reflections on the good.
Owen’s Objection
Though space may not allow for isolated treatment of objections, there is at least one
important objection raised by H. P. Owen that we can unpack. Owen writes,
The theist can attempt to prove the existence of a moral Absolute on the grounds
of religious experience. The core of the argument is that the religious person feels
himself to be in the presence of an ineffable, all-encompassing, mystery. Those
who practise the ‘higher’ religions (pre-eminently Judaism and Christianity)
interpret this mystery in terms of moral holiness. This experience guarantees the
existence of its object.
The argument is invalid. The experience may be psychologically selfauthenticating to its possessors; but it is not logically so to the skeptic. All the
skeptic needs to do is, firstly, to dispel the numinous element by the usual
methods of reductionism, and secondly to show that what is left is a purely moral
experience of an absolute (or at any rate very high) ideal which (for the reasons I
have given) need not objectively exist.90
It should be first noted that Owen still believes a moral argument can be offered and is
compelling, only that it will not take the form above, as being from religious belief. We have
already quoted Owen in affirmation when we discussed obligations and especially of the sort that
values seem to impose, so there is no need to deny what Owen seeks to show there. However,
perhaps it remains useful to include religious belief in the category of evidence, especially in the
form of the interaction of one with Scripture and the effect of personal influence.
The first thing we can note in response to Owen is that our goal with these latter two
phenomena is not to assert so strong a conclusion as “This experience guarantees the existence of
its object,” at least not in an objective sense. He is suggesting that such an idea is not logically
compelling to the skeptic, but of course that is to be expected. As I have tried to make clear, I do
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not believe that religious belief or experience is best explained or demonstrated in logical
categories (though logic has its place and can still be quite useful in various roles with the moral
argument, particularly in supportive roles of highlighting and displaying the consistency of
different elements of the belief or defending their rationality).
The truth we are trying to investigate or ascertain is one relating to the existence of
another being, of His being in the world and real. If He is real, I will meet Him best, apprehend
Him most fully only in a real or experiential way, of the sort I am suggesting can occur through
narrative and personal influence. These methods open the door for a personal encounter, a
second-person experience. In saying that I know my wife, know she exists or her character, I will
not find this truth most grounded, most real in my abstract mental reflections of her but rather in
my real experience of her, here in the world.
For this reason, Owen’s criticisms utilizing the skeptic’s response seem to miss the point.
I do not think dispelling the numinous element through reductionism succeeds in the way he
suggests. The skeptic has not actually “dispelled” the numinous element of his own in any way
but only dismissed another’s experience of the numinous. Since these truths are not deductive, of
course you can dismiss someone else’s numinous experience and suggest that it is only a “moral”
experience, but this does not impact the truth of the numinous experience in any way. I am
saying that numinous experience is exactly the thing that is needed and powerful. Until the
skeptic has undergone this himself, his criticisms have no power over the believer (and even
when he has had some sort of experience, his judgments will not reach the believer since they
will be different by virtue of the skeptic’s individual personality). To the extent that the skeptic
attempts to dismiss the religious experience grounding or providing content to the believer, the
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skeptic is attempting to reduce to the notional what is real in the believer, and this cannot be
done—at least not in any way that is accurate.
With this objection addressed, we will return to Crime and Punishment in the next
chapter, where I will seek to display what these expansive epistemological points look like in
practice, so to speak. As expressed, the sorts of second-person encounters which lead to
knowledge of persons are best expressed through narrative and story; hopefully, through
encountering the narrative of Raskolnikov, we will be able to glimpse something of the moral
argument for which I am arguing.
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As if forgetting herself, [Sonya] jumped up and, wringing her hands, walked halfway
across the room; but she came back quickly and sat down again beside [Raskolnikov], almost
touching him, shoulder to shoulder. All at once, as if pierced, she gave a start, cried out, and, not
knowing why, threw herself on her knees before him.
“What, what have you done to yourself!” she said desperately, and, jumping up from her
knees, threw herself on his neck, embraced him, and pressed him very, very tightly in her arms.91
Chapter Five: Crime, Punishment, and Conclusions
Raskolnikov’s Journey
Crime and Punishment is an exploration—a psychological exploration of one man and
the consequences of his actions. Raskolnikov is on a journey, though primarily one of his mind
and soul. In the first chapter we set up some details regarding the storyline, Raskolnikov’s inner
conflict, and one of his haunting dreams. Having now laid out our epistemological
considerations, personal knowledge, and developed this further in its relation to the moral
argument, I would like to dig deeper into the story of Raskolnikov as it relates to these items. In
Raskolnikov’s journey in Crime and Punishment, I see evidence of the points relating to the
moral argument that I have introduced, and we have already touched on the usefulness of
narrative in conveying knowledge of persons. We will begin by a discussion of the effect of
conscience, and then the effect of Sonya on Raskolnikov, before attempting to identify a bit more
closely the nature of Raskolnikov’s redemption.

The Effect of Conscience
The role that Raskolnikov’s conscience plays is likely the most obvious and clear here
within the work. Even the name “Raskolnikov” comes from Russian roots meaning “schism” or
“to split.”92 Throughout the novel, Raskolnikov is plagued and tormented by his mind, which
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shows in dreams like the one mentioned in chapter one, fever and delirium, fainting (this
happens in the police headquarters when he overhears the police talking about the murders),
contemplation of suicide, and wavering between confessing and avoiding detection. It has been
suggested that this internal conflict within Raskolnikov is presented externally by Dostoevsky in
the characters of “Svidrigailov, epitome of self-willed evil, and Sonia, epitome of self-sacrifice
and spiritual goodness.”93
Svidrigailov is an individual for whom Raskolnikov’s sister (Dunya) used to work (as a
housekeeper, essentially) and who had become obsessed and enamored with Dunya. Svidrigailov
is a selfish individual who seemingly has no real qualms about morality; he knows he is base but
does not seem to be inclined to change (at one place he says, “I am indeed a depraved and idle
person”94). He is also plagued by visions of his wife who recently died; it is never clearly
established that he was a direct cause of her death, but he seems to be aware that he was not good
to her (having constantly been involved in adulterous relationships) and may have played some
role in the decline of her health.95 The visions he is having as well as recognition of his depravity
link him to Raskolnikov, who has committed an evil act and is grappling with delirium and
dreams (a connection even further emphasized if Svidrigailov did, in fact, kill his wife).
Svidrigailov has apparently decided he does not want to change or that he cannot; he refuses to
let go of his depraved nature—he refuses to repent.
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Sonya is a Christ-figure, an image of light and goodness, but one who has been
circumstantially stained. Because of her drunkard of a father (Marmeladov), she has turned to
prostitution in order to provide money for her family, who would starve otherwise and already
cannot keep up payments for their lodging. She is humble and self-sacrificing, giving up
everything, including her own innocence, to attempt to make a way for her family. When
Raskolnikov finally confesses to Sonya what he has done, she explains to him what he must do
in response:
“What to do!” she exclaimed, suddenly jumping up from her place, and
her eyes, still full of tears, suddenly flashed. “Stand up!” (She seized him by the
shoulder; he rose, looking at her almost in amazement.) “Go now, this minute,
stand in the crossroads, bow down, and first kiss the earth you’ve defiled, then
bow to the whole world, on all four sides, and say aloud to everyone: ‘I have
killed!’ Then God will send you life again. … Accept suffering and redeem
yourself by it, that’s what you must do.”96
In these two persons, we see personified some of the conflict Raskolnikov is facing. He
can refuse repentance, like Svidrigailov, continuing on the path he is on; or he can repent,
following Sonya’s directives. Svidrigailov seems to be aware of exactly this when he tells Sonya,
“‘There are two ways open for Rodion Romanovich [Raskolnikov]: a bullet in the head, or
Siberia.’”97 This is because Svidrigailov has apparently realized that he cannot defeat his
conscience or live with himself, but he refuses to repent. Indeed, shortly following these
statements to Sonya, he shoots himself in the head. 98 So the stage is set for Raskolnikov. He can
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decide to refuse repentance, though he will not be able to live with himself and the psychological
conflict going on, or he can take the path of Sonya, taking upon himself a burden of suffering to
serve others.
Some things can be noted regarding Raskolnikov’s conscience. Raskolnikov’s motives
are only partially clear throughout much of the novel, but he seems to reveal most accurately his
true motivations and thought process in this exemplary passage worth quoting at length:
“Be still, Sonya, I’m not laughing at all, I know myself that a devil was
dragging me. Be still, Sonya, be still!” he repeated gloomily and insistently. “I
know everything. I thought it all out and whispered it all out when I was lying
there in the dark… I argued it all out with myself, to the last little trace, and I
know everything, everything! … I wanted to kill without casuistry, Sonya, to kill
for myself, for myself alone! I didn’t want to lie about it even to myself! It was
not to help my mother that I killed—nonsense! I did not kill so that, having
obtained means and power, I could become a benefactor of mankind. Nonsense! I
simply killed—killed for myself, for myself alone—and whether I would later
become anyone’s benefactor, or would spend my life like a spider, catching
everyone in my web and sucking the life-sap out of everyone, should at that
moment have made no difference to me!... And it was not money above all that I
wanted when I killed Sonya; not money so much as something else… I know all
this now… Understand me: perhaps, continuing on that same path, I would never
again repeat the murder. There was something else I wanted to know: something
else was nudging my arm. I wanted to find out then, and find out quickly, whether
I was a louse like all the rest, or a man? Would I be able to step over, or not!
Would I dare to reach down and take, or not? Am I a trembling creature, or do I
have the right…”
“To kill? The right to kill?” Sonya clasped her hands.99
Raskolnikov lays it all out now; he wanted to know if he was a sort of Nietzschean
übermensch. He wanted to know if he could step over conventions of right and wrong.
Consequently, one objection regarding Raskolnikov’s conscience is that the torment he feels is
not about remorse for his evil actions, but rather the pangs of his pride as he realizes that he is
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not a man but a louse. Firstly, it can be noted that the conscience does not have to be infallible in
its deliverances to be evidentially significant and so even if Raskolnikov’s conscience is
bothering him regarding his pride rather than conviction of his guilt for his actions, his feelings
of conscience are significant. Secondly, it is not necessary that the true nature of his conscience
be transparent to himself. He could attribute the wrong source to the tormenting feeling he has.
Thirdly, I do not think it is impossible to see here a combination of psychological factors. On my
reading, it seems Raskolnikov is tormented in his conscience regarding his evil actions and also
that his pride is deeply wounded because he is tormented by his conscience. The tormenting of
his conscience is confirmation that he is not an ubermensch, not a “Napoleon”;100 a Napoleon has
the right to step over morality by virtue of being such a person. This also provides a way of
understanding why Raskolnikov is not completely remorseful; he still seems to believe his thesis
about the ubermensch or Napoleon, but to realize that he is not one yet. And so his conscience is
tormenting him, but he is not yet repentant.

The Effect of Sonya
As noted, Sonya functions within the narrative as a Christ-like figure. Raskolnikov first
learns of her and her circumstances through her father Marmeladov in the second chapter of the
book. Then, after Marmeladov is seriously injured and dying, Raskolnikov sees her again at
Marmeladov’s deathbed. The next day she shows up at Raskolnikov’s lodging (while
Raskolnikov’s family is with him) to ask if he would join her and her family at a memorial
dinner for Marmeladov. There is something strange and captivating in their encounter;
Raskolnikov tells her he will come to see her soon.
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Their first encounter alone is awkward in its beginning, as their connection is in regard to
her father and that on a chance encounter Raskolnikov had with Marmeladov in a bar.
Raskolnikov has already noted the strange childish innocence she has, her meager lodging, and
knows that she is prostituting herself out in order to provide for her family. As their conversation
develops, it regards her family mostly, and she displays an extraordinary amount of compassion
and love for them, even blaming herself for minor things that she could have done better to love
them. In a sort of mean way he presses on her the reality that her consumptive mother-in-law will
likely die soon and her sister will then need to go into prostitution as well; when she protests that
God would not allow it, he laughs and chides, “‘But maybe there isn’t any God.’”101 At this
point, she breaks into tears and is silent for some minutes. Then, in a strange turn, he kneels
before her and kisses her foot.
Raskolnikov, who is quite perceptive and intelligent, has apprehended Sonya for what she
is: a humble, pure, self-sacrificial being willing to shoulder her cross of suffering in order to save
her family. He is puzzled by her and says, “‘I said it of you not for your dishonor and sin, but for
your great suffering. But that you are a great sinner is true.’”102 He presses into this, suggesting
that she has destroyed herself through sin in vain because she will not end up saving anyone.
“‘But tell me, finally,’ he spoke almost in a frenzy, ‘how such shame and baseness can be
combined in you beside other opposite and holy feelings? It would be more just, a thousand
times more just and reasonable, to jump headfirst into the water and end it at once!’ ‘And what
would become of them?’ Sonya asked weakly…”103 And Raskolnikov sees it all, sees the
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suffering that she has carried, sees the despair she has been through, the thoughts of suicide, the
complete lack of concern for his cruel words. But he cannot understand her and how she is able
to keep going. He is confused at why, in the midst of all of her shame and depravity, she would
not turn to suicide as a better recourse. He saw that so far none of the depravity had actually
reached her heart, but he did not believe it could last.
He realizes next that it is only through God that she has sustained herself through these
trials and Sonya confirms this with cries that God “does everything.” “‘Here’s the solution…’ he
decided to himself… ‘A holy fool!’”104 Raskolnikov notices the New Testament on her chest of
drawers and asks her to read the story of Lazarus from the Gospel of John to him. Sonya’s
reading of the passage is conveyed by Dostoevsky in astounding perception and poignancy, as
Sonya is clearly envisioning Raskolnikov before her, knowing he is Lazarus needing to be raised
from the dead. The reading of the passage ends in silence and Raskolnikov immediately begins
on a new topic: “‘I left my family today,’ he said, ‘my mother and sister. I won’t go to them now.
I’ve broken with everything there.’ … ‘I have only you now,’ he added. ‘Let’s go together…
I’ve come to you. We’re cursed together, so let’s go together!’ … She went on looking at him,
understanding nothing. She understood only that he was terribly, infinitely unhappy.”105 In the
end, Raskolnikov prepares to depart, telling her that when he sees her next he will tell her who
killed Lizaveta (the sister of the old crone).
Beyond being incredibly beautiful writing, this passage illustrates some very important
points that I would like to highlight. (1) The passage shows how Sonya is beginning to form an
impression on Raskolnikov; he calls her a “holy fool,” but he is also baffled and impressed by
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her ability to carry on under the suffering she carries. Though she is in the midst of terrible
circumstances, in which she has “killed herself” in a way through sacrificing her innocence, he
sees her purity and love for her family, her self-sacrifice and suffering. Sonya is a moral
exemplar, and her life, conveyed through her personal interaction with Raskolnikov has
convinced him of her holiness though he seems to doubt the strength of her source (God). He is
at least captured enough by her holiness, though, to indicate that he will confess something big to
her (who killed Lizaveta), which, as we know, he does later in the book.
(2) Raskolnikov sees part of himself in Sonya; as noted above, he sees her as having
“killed herself”: “‘You’ll understand later… Haven’t you done the same thing? You, too, have
stepped over… were able to step over. You laid hands on yourself, you destroyed a life… your
own (it’s all the same!).’”106 As noted earlier, Sonya represents one path for Raskolnikov—the
path of repentance and bearing one’s own suffering for the sake of others’ well-being. He is
drawn to her through her holiness and through his identification of their commonality in
suffering. Svidrigailov has also (presumably) taken the life of his wife, and so Raskolnikov can
identify with him as well, and find his other choice.
(3) Raskolnikov and Sonya participate in a narrative within the story—that of the raising
of Lazarus. Of all passages, this is the one that Raskolnikov asks Sonya to read, and
Dostoevsky’s text seems to indicate that they are both listening attentively in such a way as to be
in position for a real apprehension of the text, a second-person experience. Does Raskolnikov
identify himself with Lazarus?
We have already looked at many key passages from Raskolnikov’s later confession to
Sonya; the passage regarding his motives earlier in the chapter takes place during the confession,
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as well as the epigraph to this chapter, which I might recommend reading again at this point.
Sonya never deserts Raskolnikov and consistently points him toward repentance and voluntary
acceptance of his suffering, toward redemption. After he confesses his crime to the police and is
sent to Siberia, she follows with him. She comes and sees him regularly, though he is often
withdrawn and distant. She displays and embodies holiness and remains consistent over time
without being overbearing. Her consistent holy example within his life is key for the redemption
that is to come.

Redemption
The moment of transformation—of redemption—comes at the very end of the book, in
the last two pages. We will return to this moment shortly, but I would first like to clarify some of
the steps leading to this one. First, Raskolnikov confesses to Sonya, as I have already mentioned.
He finds in her a confidant to whom he can pour out his soul. Second, he does end up obeying
her instructions of what he should do in response to his sin: bowing down in the Haymarket and
kissing the ground as a symbolic apology to humanity (though he does not follow through with
the public apology of “I have killed,” for after he sees people jeering he loses his nerve). Third,
he goes through with his confession, though he loses his nerve here multiple times. In all of this,
he is not yet repentant; in a conversation with Dunya after she understands what he has done
(conveyed to her through Svidrigailov who overhead Raskolnikov’s confession to Sonya),
Raskolnikov still defends his actions. I believe these three steps toward redemption are indicative
of some level of guilt or remorse that he feels, of something within his conscience propelling him
further, even though he is not actually repentant yet.
It becomes even clearer that he is not repentant after he is taken to Siberia. Raskolnikov
is still divided within himself and removed from the rest of humanity. Sonya has followed him to
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Siberia and comes to visit him, but he is cold and distant with her. The other inmates dislike and
revile him, though they love Sonya. Dostoevsky writes, “‘You’re godless! You don’t believe in
God!’ they shouted. ‘You ought to be killed.’ He had never talked with them about God or belief,
but they wanted to kill him for being godless… Still another question remained insoluble for
him: why had they all come to love Sonya so much?”107 Even without having to say anything to
them, the inmates decry Raskolnikov, and he does nothing to respond because he seems to see it
only from a distance, as a curiosity—he is not present to them.
After about nine months like this in Siberia, Raskolnikov gets sick. While he is sick, he
has a dream, one that is haunting and stirring, though difficult to explain. Dostoevsky does not
explain any direct meaning of it in the text, but it leaves a deep impression on Raskolnikov of
which he cannot let go. The dream regards some sort of trichinae that lodge themselves within
people, causing these people to go mad. However, these mad individuals become possessed of
unshakeable certainty of their intelligence and grasp of the truth, such that their convictions and
deliverances on all subjects seem to them incontrovertible. Dostoevsky describes this affecting
nearly the whole world and the breakdown in society that occurs since no one can work together
or get along together. Everything is dying and the pestilence spreads further. There are supposed
to be some chosen people, pure and holy, responsible for bringing new life, but no one has seen
or heard them.
Raskolnikov has this dream in his head and thoughts for the remainder of his illness. It is
likely that much of the effect of the dream is implicit and experiential, not necessarily logical.
Whatever it means exactly, we see the consequences soon after. Raskolnikov hears that Sonya is
sick and becomes worried about her; she is not seriously ill, though, and lets him know she will
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see him soon. Raskolnikov goes out with a guard and some other workers where they are
working on baking gypsum. Raskolnikov escapes for a break, looking out over the steppe:
Raskolnikov sat and stared fixedly, not tearing his eyes away; his thought turned
to reverie, to contemplation; he was not thinking of anything, but some anguish
troubled and tormented him.
Suddenly Sonya was beside him. She came up almost inaudibly and sat
down next to him. It was still very early; the morning chill had not softened yet.
She was wearing her poor old wrap and the green shawl. Her face still bore signs
of illness; it had become thinner, paler, more pinched. She smiled to him amiably
and joyfully, but gave him her hand as timidly as ever.
She always gave him her hand timidly; sometimes she even did not give it
at all, as if fearing he might push it away. He always took her hand as if with
loathing, always met her as if with vexation, was sometimes obstinately silent
during the whole time of her visit. There were occasions when she trembled
before him and went away in deep grief. But this time their hands did not
separate; he glanced at her quickly and fleetingly, said nothing, and lowered his
eyes to the ground. They were alone; no one saw them. The guard had his back
turned at the moment.
How it happened he himself did not know, but suddenly it was as if
something lifted him and flung him down at her feet. He wept and embraced her
knees. For the first moment she was terribly frightened, and her whole face went
numb. She jumped up and looked at him, trembling. But all at once, in that same
moment, she understood everything. Infinite happiness lit up in her eyes; she
understood, and for her there was no longer any doubt that he loved her, loved her
infinitely, and that at last the moment had come…
They wanted to speak but could not. Tears stood in their eyes. They were
both pale and thin, but in those pale, sick faces there already shone the dawn of a
renewed future, of a complete resurrection into a new life. They were resurrected
by love; the heart of each held infinite sources of life for the heart of the other.
…. he was risen and he knew it, he felt it fully with the whole of his
renewed being.…108
Raskolnikov has a moment of transformation in a literary passage of unspeakable depth
and beauty. This journey, this discussion through this whole paper, is exemplified in many ways
through Raskolnikov’s journey in Crime and Punishment.
It is through his conscience that the first indications come, that the guilt begins to press
on him. He is tormented and oppressed by the feeling that he has stepped over morality but
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should not have.109 This is presented in dramatic and powerful form through the narrative but is a
common phenomenon of human experience. Next, Raskolnikov encounters Sonya, who
embodies Christ to him; she points him toward repentance and redemption. Additionally, they
read the narrative of Jesus and Lazarus, in which Jesus raises Lazarus from the dead.
Raskolnikov appears to still have this passage in mind during the redemption scene when
Dostoevsky describes Raskolnikov’s thoughts: “he was risen and he knew it.”
Now the narrative example can only go so far, and there are, of course, things that are not
stated explicitly. For one, it is not explicitly stated that Raskolnikov repents; secondly, it is not
explicitly stated that what Raskolnikov gains is knowledge of the existence of God. Both of
these, I believe, are implicit within the narrative. Regarding repentance, I would suggest that the
self-integration that occurs between Raskolnikov’s last encounter with Sonya and the opinion of
the inmates, and the encounter in this redemption scene evidence an internal change in
Raskolnikov towards the good. For the entire novel, Raskolnikov has been divided against
himself—divided against the good, as evidence by the Svidrigailov/Sonya external conflict—and
has been unable to come close to anyone. He is removed from his only friend, Razumikhin, he is
removed from his mother and sister, he is removed from Sonya; he is even distant from people
generally, as in the inmates’ perception of him. It is startling that this has suddenly changed in
his approach to Sonya, and I believe it is only because there is a change within. He is no longer
divided against himself because he has become integrated around the good.110 It is only because
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repentance has occurred—because re-integration around the good has occurred—that
Raskolnikov is able to fall on his knees before Sonya and is able to love another person. This is
all further strengthened by Dostoevsky conveying that by the time Raskolnikov returns to the
barracks, the inmates have already started to look at him differently. Raskolnikov realizes this
and understands it, thinking, “but that was how it had to be: did not everything have to change
now?”111
Regarding whether it is that Raskolnikov now believes in the existence of God, I believe
this is also intended by Dostoevsky; the Lazarus parallel, as well as the symbolic representation
of Sonya, are intended to suggest this. One might reply that even if the author suggested it, this
does not mean it is realistic. But again, it is through these kinds of moments, through conscience
and the witness of holiness, through Scripture, that so many come to a knowledge of God. The
methods here are also especially important for relating the character of God. Raskolnikov
understands something of God’s view of righteousness and justice through his conscience, of
God’s grace, mercy, and love through Sonya, and of God’s compassion through the story of
Lazarus. All of these intensely personal and morally revealing methods are the ones that
Dostoevsky portrays in the story. One of the particular strengths of moral apologetics is the
ability to communicate not just evidence that God exists, but also to communicate who He is.

Conclusion
Finally, we reach the consideration of the main thesis regarding an expansive
epistemology. Could this same knowledge have been effectively conveyed in propositions? Even
my main ideas stated in premises would be substantially less impactful removed from the
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narrative examples provided throughout and especially in this chapter. This does not mean that
there are not important things that can be captured propositionally, but there is the potential that
something is lost when we do this because the truths in discussion here are not just logical and
notional. They extend beyond this, they are real and experiential and until they are apprehended
that way, one cannot properly assess their content and judge its warrant. The nature of morality
requires an expansive epistemology for a full grasp of its import.
And so when it comes to the moral argument, arguably when one opens his eyes to an
expansive epistemology, to the experiential and the poetic, the relational and aesthetic, the
personal and phenomenological, he finds a wider range of evidence for God’s existence. There
are epistemological frameworks like Stump’s and Newman’s that can help to categorize this
broader rationality, expansive epistemology, and richer empiricism, to put some analytical
clarification around it. There are ways of knowing that sometimes extend beyond what is
captured by propositions, the narrowly empirical, the domain of logic choppers and positivists.
These personal ways of knowing provide a congenial context in which to feel the force of the
moral argument(s) for God’s existence—and for His goodness and grace.
In 1922 G. K. Chesterton wrote a sonnet entitled “The Convert,” which seems
appropriate in relation to Raskolnikov’s journey and the conclusion of this work:
After one moment when I bowed my head
And the whole world turned over and came upright,
And I came out where the old road shone white,
I walked the ways and heard what all men said,
Forests of tongues, like autumn leaves unshed,
Being not unlovable but strange and light:
Old riddles and new creeds, not in despite
But softly, as men smile about the dead.
The sages have a hundred maps to give
That trace their crawling cosmos like a tree,
They rattle reason out through many a sieve
That stores the sand and lets the gold go free:
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And all these things are less than dust to me
Because my name is Lazarus and I live.112
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